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In this paper we develop a theoretical model of input supply by agricultural producers who
purchase crop insurance and so who may engage in moral hazard.  We show, through simulations, that a
combination of partial insurance coverage combined with a minimum standard for input use may reduce
substantially the problems associated with moral hazard.  Partial insurance coverage creates an incentive
for the producer to increase his use of inputs since the cost of lower output is partially borne by the
producer, an outcome  which would not be present under full coverage insurance.  Partial monitoring of
inputs, in the form of a minimum requirement for input use, has a direct effect on the reduction of moral
hazard.  We show that, rather than being substitute instruments, these are in fact complementary methods
of encouraging a more efficient supply of inputs.  Moreover, the minimum level of input use that must be
required by regulation turns out to be substantially lower than the optimal or actual input level chosen by
producers.  Since the supply of inputs for crop production occurs in many stages over the pre-planting,
planting and growing seasons, the fact that only a minimal input requirement is needed means that the cost
of implementing such a regulation can be kept much lower than would be the case for a regulation of
complete monitoring of input usage.1
I.  Introduction
Moral hazard exists whenever insurance for some activity creates an incentive for the insured to
supply less than the efficient amounts of productive inputs or level of some precautionary activity. 
Although perfect monitoring of input usage can eliminate this problem it is often too costly to do so. When
the insurer doesn’t observe all the actions taken by the insured then, once insurance is purchased, the
insured acts in a manner that increases the probability of loss that in turn enhances the likelihood of a large
claim being filed by the insured (Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983).  Thus, in order to avoid expected losses, the
insurer must adjust expectations of claims relative to those that would be relevant in the absence of
insurance.  Specifically, in the context of crop production the cost of insurance would be higher  than
would be computed using pre-insurance distributions of crop yields.  This would lead to a relatively high
price for insurance and possible nonviability in a private market context.  At the very least, inefficient input
supply would result from insurance.  If the insurance is provided and subsidized by a public agency then
moral hazard still leads to inefficiency in input supply.  Moreover, the greater is the degree of moral hazard
the greater is the subsidy cost or program cost for the public insurer.
1
Two possible instruments for reducing the impact of moral hazard are the monitoring of input use
and the offering of only partial insurance coverage.  Monitoring input use of producers can directly
eliminate or at least reduce  the inefficiency created by moral hazard.  However, the fact that perfect
monitoring of inputs does not generally occur for insured activities suggests it is simply too costly in
general to do so and so at best imperfect monitoring with accompanying imperfect resolution of the moral
hazard problem is usually the best that can be expected with this instrument.
2  Partial insurance coverage is
an alternative  means of correcting at least partially the incentive for insured agents to engage in moral
hazard
3.  However, this policy leads to some residual risk bearing cost for the inured as well as still
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The problems associated with moral hazard that affect the efficiency of an agricultural insurance program have
major implications for farm level decision making and public policy formulation. The relationship between efficiency and the
program costs of the current agricultural insurance policies due to problems of moral hazard has not been well documented
(Islam, 1996). 
     
2
See Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979)
     
3
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creating some disincentive to provide efficient levels of inputs. 
In this paper we develop a theoretical model of input supply by agricultural producers who
purchase crop insurance and so who may engage in moral hazard.  We show, through simulations, that a
combination of partial insurance coverage combined with a minimum standard for input use may reduce
substantially the problems associated with moral hazard.  Thus,  rather than being substitute instruments,
these are in fact complementary methods of encouraging a more efficient supply of inputs.  Although the
minimum standard requirement for inputs in our model requires “partial” monitoring of input use, this is
introduced in a manner substantially different from  that, for example, of Holmstrom (1979) or Shavell
(1979).  Rather than monitoring perfectly the input levels of the producer with a given probability, we
monitor some part of the inputs used with a probability of one.  In the context of the production of crops
this method is an attractive one.  Since the supply of inputs for crop production occurs in many stages over
the pre-planting, planting and growing seasons, the fact that only a minimal standard of input usage is
required means that the cost of implementing such a regulation  can be kept much lower than would be
required by a regulation requiring complete monitoring of input usage (that is, since perhaps only inputs of
one stage need to be monitored).  Moreover, we show that the minimum level of input use that must be
required by such a regulation turns out to be substantially lower than the optimal or actual input level
chosen by producers.  Thus; by introducing a combination of policies - partial insurance coverage and
partial monitoring of inputs to enforce a minimum level of input usage - a public insurer can reduce the
cost of insurance, and in turn reduce the level of subsidy, possibly to zero, that is required to maintain a
viable crop insurance program. 
The remainder of this paper is arranged in four sections.  Section II presents the theoretical model
used for deriving producers’ input decisions in the presence of partial insurance and a minimum input
regulation.  In Section III we develop the intuition concerning how the minimum input requirement may
encourage the producer to choose an actual input level which is substantially higher than the amount
required by the regulation despite the fact that in the absence of such a regulation the producer would in
fact not do so.  Roughly speaking, the reason for this outcome is that once the producer is required to
employ some minimal input level this reduces the probability of making an insurance claim.  With more3
possible states of the world in which the insured would actually benefit from increased input use
(i.e., instances for which output exceeds that level for which claims are made), it follows that the insurered
will voluntarily increase his input usage beyond the minimum required.  Simulation results are presented in
Section IV, while conclusions and policy implications are considered in Section V.
A note about how our model and results compare to the literature on regulation and incentives is in
order here.   We refer to the input requirement as an ex ante regulation since this is stipulated in the
contract before production decisions are made, while the partial coverage of insurance is an ex post device
for providing incentives to producers to enhance the efficiency of input usage.  This is a similar problem to
that of considering whether to use safety regulations (an ex ante mechanism) or exposure to liability for
harm to third parties (an ex post mechanism) as means for encouraging risk reduction for individuals or
firms engaged in potentially hazardous activities such as the production of nuclear energy.
4  There are,
however, many differences.  The most important differences are that: (i) in our model the “harm” from
under employing inputs accrues to the individual who chooses the rather than externalities or exposure to
risks, which harm others, through a liability rule, (ii) in our model it is implicit that the first-best level of
input usage is not regulated because it would be too costly to do so, while in the other models there is no
explicit assumption about the cost of regulating inputs at their first best efficient levels, and (iii) in our
model agents are risk averse, otherwise there would be no role for insurance.
II   Model Formulation
We use a very simple model of production in order to focus on the incentive effects of insurance
with both ex ante and ex post regulatory mechanisms.  We select this structure in order to explicitly
recognize that there is a temporal relationship between the a priori decision to use an input mix, and the ex
post realization of stochastic outcomes.  The ex ante regulators regime monitors the a priori decision, while
the ex post pays off in terms of partial coverage and ex ante compliance.  Production is assumed to be a
function of a single input, x, and the state of nature, ω .  The state of nature ω  may be interpreted as an
index variable which characterizes all weather conditions and other elements outside the producer’s direct
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See Shavell (1984), and Kolstad, C.D., T.S.Ulen, and G.V.Johnson (1990)4
control, with higher values of ω  indicating more favourable conditions.  Since ω  is a random
variable then so is the yield outcome, denoted ˜ y, with ∂ ˜ y/∂ω >0.  Thus, we  specify the production function
as follows:
where fx >0, fxx≤ 0, fω ≥ 0 (fω  >0 for x>0), and f(0,ω ) = 0
Before knowing the true state of nature, ω , a producer chooses an input level (x) in order to
maximize his expected utility of profits.  Let U(.) be the producer's von Neumann - Morgenstern utility
function where U’(.)>0 and U’’(.)<0.  Let h(ω ) represent the probability density function for the random
variable ω,  with lower bound ω  and upper bound ω,  let  P be the price of output and r the unit input cost
then we have, for the case where crop insurance is not available, the following maximization problem for
the producer:
The solution to equation (2) gives the input usage in the absence of insurance.  We use this solution in our
 simulations to provide a benchmark against which to compare the input usage in the case of insurance for
different regulatory scenarios.
We now model how the insurance program is implemented and how this affects the producer’s
input choice.  We define yc as the critical yield level which triggers insurance payments.  If actual yield (y)
falls below the critical yield (yc) [i.e., y<yc], the insurer makes up the difference.  In this situation the
insured obtains an indemnity of  P(yc-y) because of the short fall in yield, where P is the price level on
which insurance is determined.
5  The cost of insurance (i.e., premium cost) with ρ  representing the
producer’s  profit under agricultural insurance is as follows:
                    
     
5
We ignore price uncertainty in order to focus on the question of how regulations for insurance affect input choice.  If
price were variable and negatively correlated with an individual’s output, then the insurance decision may be quite different. 
However, the presence of a future’s market allows the producer to “fix” its price as long as the insured price is at the same
level.
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Since y depends positively on x (as well as ω ) it follows that for a given level of x there is a critical level of
ω , denoted ω c such that y ≤  yc if and only if ω  ≤  ω c .  Since ω c depends on x we explicitly note this by
writing ω c(x), with ω c′ (x) > 0.  Thus, we can write the probability that the producer’s yield is sufficiently
low so as to trigger a claim either in terms of y or x according to: 
(4) ] ) , ( [ Pr ) ( c y x f x ≤ = ω τ
This probability clearly depends on input use level, x.  Formally we can define τ (x) as the probability that
the producer’s output level triggers a claim where
(5) ω ω τ
ω
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c ) ( ) ( ) ( ∫ =
The maximization problem for a producer with insurance can be expressed in terms of the probability
density function (pdf) for ω  as
(6)
x
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Let the first term in equation (6) above be represented by T1(x); i.e., T1(x) = τ (x)U(Pyc-rx-ρ ).  Both utility
and the probability of output being so low as to trigger a claim is decreasing in x (i.e., τ′ (x)_0) in this state
(since x only increases costs in those states where the shortfall in yield is made up through an insurance
indemnity) then it follows that T1(x) is decreasing in x.  The second term in equation (6), T2(x)= ∫
ω
ω ) (x subc
U(Pf(x,ω ) - rx - ρ  ) h(ω ) dω , captures the producer’s payoff in those states of the world where output is
sufficiently high that an insurance claim is not made.  An increase in x increases the likelihood of no claim
being made and also increases the  level of output in these states.  Of course, increasing x also increases
costs, but, the optimal value of x balances all of these effects on T1 (x) and T2(x). 
A higher coverage level (yc) increases the importance of the term T1(x) and so induces the firm to
reduce the input level (i.e., since T1′ (x) <0).  Moreover, increasing yc  is equivalent to an increase in the
critical value of ω  (i.e., ω c), that is, according to the term T2(x) an increase in yc  reduces the likelihood that
employing any positive level of input x will have any payoff whatsoever.  Thus, higher values of yc imply
(3)
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lower optimal values of the input level x.  For sufficiently high values of yc , input use will fall to
zero.
To anticipate the effect of the ex ante mechanism, which is to require a minimal standard for input
use, consider the effect of an effective regulation that x ≥  xmin , where xmin is the minimal input level for
which the producer may receive any claim.  Thus, if the producer fails to use an input level at least as large
as xmin he will not receive any claim regardless of his yield.  If the producer’s optimal input level from the
maximization problem of equation (6) is less than this critical value xmin then choosing the same input
value in the presence of this constraint means that in fact the producer would receive no revenue or
indemnity associated with the term T1 and would only incur the cost of production for these states of the
world.  Moreover, this input level would not in fact balance the incentive for a low value of x from term T1
- against the positive effects of using a high value of x from term T2 (i.e., in these states of the world using
where x is productive).  On balance, the positive incentive to use a greater value of x would take greater
importance under this regulation and so it may be optimal for the producer to increase the use of his input.
 As one considers higher values of the input used the first term becomes less important and the second term
becomes more important in the optimization decision.  In fact, as we will show in the simulations, it is
even possible that a “relatively small” value for xmin may be sufficient to encourage the producer to employ
a substantially higher level of input than would be chosen in the unconstrained optimization problem of
equation (6)
III.  Economics of Ex-Ante Regulation
6
The problems of moral hazard in agricultural insurance arises from the fact that farmers can take a
variety of actions which affect the probability and/or size of loss and insurers can not observe these actions
(at least not costlessly).  The purpose of insurance may affect the incentives for many farm practices,
including decisions concerning fertilizer usage, soil preparation, soil conservation and ploughing
techniques, all of which affect the likelihood of making insurance claims.
                    
     
6 To conserve space, the detail theoretical (algebraic) model and comparative static results are not presented here. 
However, full theoretical model and computer programs for simulations model pertaining to how minimum ex ante standard
(Xmin) and the choice of input under ex ante regulations (Xex ante) are determined can be obtained from authors.7
However, there are a variety of ways in which the insurer can attempt to alleviate the
problem of moral hazard.  One such mechanism is through ex ante regulations, such as requiring a minimal
acceptable level of inputs.  In order to be effective, such a policy must include monitoring of selected
inputs and this may be prohibitively costly.  However, we show in this section that it is possible that the
level at which the inputs must be monitored may be quite modest and so only involve one or two aspects of
the production decision.  We model this approach by establishing a constraint on the input level x, x ≥  xmin
, which is intended to reflect the fact that only a subset of the inputs need to be monitored.  If the producers
chooses an input level less than xmin  then in the event that output falls below the critical level yc no
payment is made by the insurer.  This implies that the term T1(x) = τ (x)U(Pyc-rx-ρ ) from equation (6) takes
on the value zero for all values of x<xmin.  This effectively reduces the number of states of the world in
which insurance is collected.  Thus, in choosing his input level the producer places more emphasis on his
payouts conditional on “good” states of the world occurring (i,e., as exemplified by the term  T2(x)= ∫
U(Pf(x,ω ) - rx - ρ  ) h(ω ) dω).  The result is that the producer will have an incentive to increase his input
usage over the unconstrained case.  In fact, we show through simulations that even if the level of yc  is
sufficiently high that the producer would choose to use a zero level of input in the absence of any ex-ante
regulation, it is possible that for some reasonably small level of xmin associated with the ex-ante regulation,
the producer can be encouraged to adopt a level of input usage which is quite close to the level that would
be chosen in the absence of insurance. 
To understand clearly the role of such an ex-ante regulation consider first an example of extreme
moral hazard created by the presence of insurance coverage in the absence of any ex-ante regulation on
input usage.  As for all of our examples, we assume the distribution of states of the world to be uniform
and we use the constant absolute risk aversion utility function
7.  In figure 1 we plot expected utility as a
                    
7 For purposes of our simulations, the implications of adopting these assumptions are clearly detailed in the
appendix.8
function of input level x for an example with coverage level yc equal to 50% of average income
8.
 As seen in Figure 1 for this example the global optimum for input usage is x=0.  Increasing x from zero
reduces expected utility because the cost of the input is not counterbalanced by the expected value of
output.  This occurs because the number of states of the world in which insurance coverage is obtained,
and hence input usage has zero value, is so large.  As the input level rises, eventually expected utility starts
to increase in x because after a certain point x is high enough to induce ω c to be high enough such that the
term T1 becomes less important (i.e., the number of states of the world in which insurance is collected
shrinks).  Consequently increasing x does increase expected utility through its effect on term T2. 
Eventually an interior (local) optimum is reached at value x=9.38, a level which is just slightly less that the
level of x in the absence of insurance 
9. 
Now, if the insurer could introduce a constraint x ≥  xmin  as indicated in Figure 1(i.e., no insurance
would be collected if x were chosen to be less than this level) then the local interior optimum of x=9.38
would become the global optimum.  Intuitively, such a constraint effectively reduces the number of
instances or states of the world in which insurance will be collected and so reduces the payoff to using a
low level of inputs.  Thus, even though the value of xmin is substantially less than 9.6, the ex-ante constraint
is sufficient to induce a relatively high level of input usage.
Reducing the insurance coverage level (yc) reduces the incentive to engage in moral hazard,
although x=0 may still be optimal in the absence of an ex-ante regulatory constraint.  However, the lower is
insurance coverage the smaller must be the value of xmin required to induce a relatively large input usage
(i.e., to make the local interior optimum the global optimum).  It is in this sense that the two instruments of
partial insurance coverage, rather than full coverage, and the ex ante regulatory constraint on the input
usage are complementary policies for alleviating the problems of moral hazard.
                    
8 Other parameters values of the model: P=$5.0, r=$2.0, γ =0.05, and  θ =2
9 Using the same parameters as used for this example we find that the optimal choice of x for the no insurance
scenario (i.e., the solution to the problem of equation (2) is x=8.34).   9
IV.   Simulation Results and Discussions 
To evaluate the impact of ex ante regulations against the insured’s optimizing behaviour,
simulation
models were developed and run for a hypothetical case situation.  Noting space considerations and the
primary objective of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of ex ante regulations, the specific
mathematical details will not be presented, but can be obtained from the authors.
Optimal Input Decisions Under Ex ante Regulations
Several properties of the two policy instruments are illustrated by the simulation results reported in
Table 1.  In the first column we indicate the percentage of expected output (EY) relative to the outcome
under no insurance that is used for the coverage level (yc) in each simulation run.  Column 2 indicates the
yield level that this percentage induces.  Column 3 reports the input choice under no insurance, which is
our benchmark and does not vary, while column 4 indicates the level of input that the producer would use
under insurance but with no ex ante regulatory constraint.  Column 5 provides the percentage reduction in
input usage induced by insurance.  Note that for coverage levels of 35% and less of expected output under
insurance, the impact of insurance on input usage is insignificant (less than 2% reduction in each case). 
However, once insurance coverage reaches 40%, the producer chooses to engage in extreme moral hazard
and chooses zero input level.  In column 6 we show the minimum or critical level for xmin required as an ex
ante regulatory constraint on input usage that is needed in order to induce the producer to not engage in
extreme moral hazard and to instead choose the interior local optimum illustrated in Figure 1 as the global
optimum.  Column 7 then gives the input choice associated with this interior optimum with column 8
indicating the percentage reduction in input usage under insurance with the ex ante regulatory constraint
relative to no insurance whatsoever.  Input reduction is quite modest even for relatively high levels of
insurance coverage
10.  Also  note from columns 7 and 8 that the lower is the coverage level the lower is the
                    
10  For example, with 80% coverage and ex ante constraint x ≥ 4.91 we have only a 10.62% reduction in input usage10
ex ante mechanism required to generate an interior optimum for choice of input level.  
The choice of input under insurance with and without ex ante regulations, at different coverage
levels are given in Table 1.  Results indicate that input choice under ex ante regulations (column 7) is close
to the optimal input choice under no insurance (column 3).  Compared to the input choice under regular
insurance (column 4), one can see a minimal effect of insurance on input use with ex ante regulations at
any coverage levels.  The implications of this result is that there will be minimal distortions of agricultural
input use for an insurance program with ex ante regulations.  At low coverage levels (up to 35% in this
study), ex ante regulation are not requires, since the choice of input under insurance (xWI) is close to the
choice of input under an ex ante regulation (x ex ante)  However, at higher coverage levels, specifying a
minimal level of input use as a regulatory constraint induces an insured to choose a higher level of x.  For
example, at a 40% coverage level, the requirement of a minimal level of input use (xmin) at 0.53 units is
sufficient to induce the insured to use 9.43 units of input.  In contrast  0 units would be used under
insurance without ex ante requirements (Table 1).
Figure 2 illustrates how the ex ante mechanism works using an example based on the simulation
results at a 40% coverage level.  Without ex ante regulations, insureds choose only 0.01 units of input to
maximize expected utility of profits, EU(Π )=-0.422.  From the diagram it can be seen that there is a local
interior optimum that can be achieved through specifying a regulatory constraint in the form of x≥ xmin. 
This
constraint induces an insured to choose a higher level of input.  In this example(i.e., at 40% coverage
level), specifying xmin≥ 0.53 units induces the insured to choose x=xex ante=9.43 units.  Importantly, this is
also the point of local maximum for optimal EU(Π )=-0.444. 
Ex ante regulation works for higher coverage levels (in this model, up to 80%) in an analogous
manner as explained above for the 40% coverage level.  However, at full coverage level (i.e., at 100%
coverage level), based on our simulation results, ex ante regulation is still applicable but may not be that
effective since no local interior optimum exists.  This can be seen from Figure 3.  By saying "ex ante
                                                                 
compared to a 100% reduction which occurs in the absence of any ex ante regulation. 11
regulation may not be that effective at higher coverage levels" what we mean is that there is no
"small" xmin value that will induce producers, in light of the constraint x≥ xmin to choose an optimal input
level under ex ante regulation (x
*
ex ante) which is "larger" than xmin.  The reason is that there is not, for this
case, (and particularly for any coverage levels at or above 85% in this model) an interior optimum which
would be the global optimum for the restricted set of inputs, x≥ xmin. 
Now, in this sense the ex ante restriction would not be applicable or particularly effective.  But it is
still true that if the constraint x≥ xmin is imposed, the producer will choose xmin rather than zero (which they
would choose under extreme moral hazard conditions).  The ex ante regulation is effective in that the
constraint is binding (by definition) and xmin>0 induces a higher input choice than having no ex ante
regulation at all.  In contrast, where "an interior optimum is chosen" as a result of some xmin large enough,
the regulation is "more effective" in that it induces an optimal choice of x which is actually larger (and
perhaps substantially larger) than the minimum requirement, xmin.  
Let us illustrate some of the intuitions discussed above with the aid of Figure 3.  Suppose it was
feasible - even cheap - to have a regulation x≥ xmin where xmin>0 for this case.  Then the choice of the
farmer would be x=xmin (i.e., he would only use the level he is required to use).  Here, the ex ante
regulation is still applicable and effective at higher coverage levels as it induces a higher (than 0) level of
input use.  However, it is not as effective as it would be if there were an interior optimum involving a value
of x
*
ex ante being substantially greater than xmin.             
Results presented in Table 1 further indicate that at low coverage levels (i.e., at 10-35% coverage
levels), ex ante regulation is not necessary since xWI=x
*
ex ante.  However, for coverage levels of 40% to 80%
associated with no input use (extreme moral hazard) under regular insurance, an ex ante regulation is very
effective.  At these higher coverage levels, by specifying xmin as a regulatory constraint, the insurer can
induce insureds to choose a higher input level. 
Results pertaining to xmin and the choice of input under ex ante regulation, xex ante (columns 6 and 712
respectively in Table 1) strongly support corollaries 1 and 2 (∂ xmin/∂ yc >0, and ∂ xex ante/∂ yc <0). 
Intuitively the higher the coverage level, the higher the value of xmin that must be specified ex ante to
induce insureds to choose a level of input that prevents extreme moral hazard.  As coverage levels increase,
the choice of x under ex ante regulation goes down.   This implies that in states of the world in which
insurance is collected the marginal physical product of x is zero, yet the marginal cost is borne in all states
of the world.  Consequently, coverage levels (yc), result in more states in which reducing x makes sense. 
This is true whether there are ex ante regulations or not, since ∂ x/∂ yc <0 in the ordinary insurance regime
as well. 
The first conclusion from these results is that the application of ex ante regulations can be very
effective in mitigating extreme moral hazard problems which can exist with regular insurance at higher 
coverage levels.  Second, ex ante regulations can still be applicable and effective at high coverage levels
(at or above 85% in this model) but may not be as effective as lower coverage levels for which an interior
optimum involving a value of x substantially larger than xmin exists. 
Reduction in Optimal Input Use: Regular Insurance vs Ex ante Regulations
In Table 1, a percentage reduction in optimal input use under insurance alone (column 5) and
insurance with ex ante regulations (column 8) were computed and compared with the no insurance
scenario (column 3).  Up to the 35% coverage level, percentage reductions of optimal input under
insurance and insurance with ex ante regulations are almost comparable.  For example, at a 35% coverage
level, optimal input use decreases by only 1.35% under both insurance and insurance with ex ante
regulations compared to the no insurance scenario.  At higher coverage levels, optimal input use decreases
more under insurance than insurance with ex ante regulations.  At a 40% coverage level, the introduction
of insurance induces an 99.80% reduction, while insurance with ex ante regulations induces only a 1.77%
reduction in optimal input use.  However, at a 80% coverage level, ex ante regulation induces a 10.62%13
reduction in optimal input use as opposed to 100% reduction under regular insurance.  
According to the simulations, the conclusion is that regular agricultural insurance will likely lead
to relatively minor reductions in farm applications of agricultural inputs if coverage levels are very low,
while insurance will likely lead to significant reductions in input use at higher coverage levels.  This
further implies that moral hazard can be a significant problem if coverage levels reach a certain threshold. 
Ex ante regulation raises the threshold coverage levels at which no inputs are used. The introduction of ex
ante regulations, which require a minimal level of precautionary input use for a particular insurance
coverage, will induce insureds to increase their level of input use, which in turn will mitigate the severity
of damage and essentially could eliminate the moral hazard problem compared to regular insurance.  
Program Costs From Moral Hazard: With and Without Ex-ante Regulations
11
Program costs
12 under ex ante regulations (column 13) as opposed to regular insurance (column
12) are also presented in Table 1. There are substantial differences between program costs under insurance
and ex ante regulations.  For example, at a 40% coverage level, program costs under ex ante regulations is
found to be $0.04 as opposed to $17.23 under insurance (Table 1).  The difference increases with higher
coverage levels.  For instance, at a 80% coverage level, insurance alone imposes a cost of $30.67
compared to only $0.91 under ex ante regulation.  The ex ante regulation induces the insured to choose a
higher level of input use rather than practice the extreme moral hazard evident at higher coverage levels. 
Since ex ante regulations induce insureds to use more inputs under insurance, that eventually reduces the
insured's chance of collecting higher expected indemnities, which in turn also reduces program costs. 
                    
     
11 This paper ignores the monitoring costs of regulating a minimal input use.  Moreover, comparing the monitoring
costs with the savings in program costs under ex ante regulations is beyond the scope of this paper.  Therefore, this paper
ignores this issue explicitly. 
12 Again to conserve space, the methodology to compute program costs for a particular insurance contract under
regular insurance and insurance with ex ante regulations of a myopic insurer from moral hazard are not presented here.
However, the detail methodology of computing program costs that can be attributed to the problems of asymmetric information
such as moral hazard and adverse selection can be obtained from authors.14
V.  Conclusions and Implications For Policy Formulations
The presence of moral hazard is identified in this paper and the magnitude of program costs
attributed to moral hazard are found to be substantial.  It is evident that existing agricultural insurance
contracts are inappropriate in mitigating the severity of moral hazard problems.  To alleviate the problems
of moral hazard and also to reduce the magnitude of program costs attributed to it, this paper has analyzed
the effectiveness of ex ante regulations.  Simulation results indicate that ex ante regulations induced
insured farmers to use more inputs relative to regular insurance.  Moreover, such mechanisms alter
insureds' optimizing behaviour, and minimize perverse program costs.  Consequently, this paper provides a
specific policy prescription.  In addition to current provisions of co-insurance and deductibles, policy
makers and/or crop insurers should introduce ex ante regulations along with closer monitoring in order to
deliver more efficient agricultural insurance to farmers. 
The theoretical results of this study pertaining to ex ante regulations suggest that insurers  could
prescribe stipulated regulations about management/agronomic practices at the time an insurance contract is
signed.  Because farmers would not be able to violate the stipulations of the contract without loosing
insurance coverage in the next period and indemnities in the current period, this would result in reducing
moral hazard problems.  In addition, it is highly likely that the mere threat of auditing best management
practices would be sufficient to induce x>xmin behaviour.
Finally a comment on the significance of Figures 1-3 in the paper.  These figures identify multiple
optimums based upon the insureds risk profile and other characteristics.  Importantly all points along these
curves represent optimization behaviour in one form or another.  Throughout the text we have referred to
the low input solutions as moral hazard or extreme moral hazard, and have done so only because our
profession uses this term by convention.  However, in reality figures 1-3 make no ‘moral’ judgement
whatsoever about the levels of input used.  Indeed, all responses are clearly the result of optimal input use15
in a risk sharing regime and it is the fault of the contract, not the insured, when seemingly ‘moral
hazard’ behaviour is observed.  As the flaw is in the contract, so must be the resolution, and the ex ante
regulators regime presented in this paper will do this.16
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Table 1:  Characterizing Moral Hazard With and Without Ex-ante Regulations
Under Constant Returns to Scale Assumption












































10 0.96 9.60 9.58 0.20 0 9.58 0.20 0.12 0.122 0.122 0.001 0.001
20 1.92 9.60 9.55 0.52 0 9.55 0.52 0.48 0.482 0.482 0.002 0.002
25 2.40 9.60 9.53 0.72 0 9.53 0.72 0.75 0.756 0.756 0.006 0.006
30 2.88 9.60 9.50 1.04 0 9.50 1.04 1.08 1.09 1.09 0.01 0.01
35 3.36 9.60 9.47 1.35 0 9.47 1.35 1.47 1.49 1.49 0.020 0.02
40 3.84 9.60 0 100 0.53 9.43 1.77 1.92 19.15 1.96 17.23 0.04
45 4.32 9.60 0 100 1.12 9.38 2.29 2.43 21.55 2.49 19.12 0.06
50 4.80 9.60 0 100 1.67 9.32 2.91 3.00 23.95 3.09 20.95 0.09
60 5.76 9.60 0 100 2.68 9.21 4.38 4.32 28.75 4.52 24.43 0.20
65 6.24 9.60 0 100 3.15 9.08 5.42 5.07 31.15 5.36 26.08 0.29
70 6.72 9.60 0 100 3.65 8.96 6.67 5.88 33.55 6.30 27.67 0.42
75 7.20 9.60 0 100 4.22 8.80 8.33 6.75 35.95 7.36 29.20 0.61
80 7.68 9.60 0 100 4.91 8.58 10.62 7.68 38.35 8.59 30.67 0.91
100 9.60 9.60 0 100 N.E N.E N.E 12.0 47.95 N.E 35.95 N.E
N.E: Not Effective but still applicable (no local interior optimum exists);  Xmin stands for minimum ex ante restrictions.
a,b Percentage reduction is computed based on no insurance solution: X(NI)= 9.6;    Fig1: Choice of Optimal Level of Input with Insurance Under Ex-Ante Regulations. (Parameter values:
p = $5.0, r = $2.0, γ  = 0.05, θ  = 2.  Cov. Level = 60%)Fig2: Choice of Optimal Level of Input Under Insurance of 40% Coverage Level Under Ex-Ante
Regulations.  (Parameter values:  p = $5.0, r = $2.0, γ  = 0.05, and θ  = 2)Fig3: Optimal Input Choice with Insurance at 100% Coverage Level Under Ex-Ante Regulation. 
(Paramter values:  p = $5.0, r = $2.0, γ  = 0.05 and θ  = 2)